

THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Officers

17 April 1981

NOTE FOR: Editor, Studies in Intelligence

FROM : Assistant National Intelligence
Officer for Warning

SUBJECT : Changes for Manuscript



Attached are the changes for the
manuscript "Alert Memoranda - The Track
Record" as per our conversation on
16 April 1981.



Attachment

Substitute para 1:

The Alert Memorandum is an interagency publication issued by the Director of Central Intelligence on behalf of the Intelligence Community. It warns explicitly of impending potential developments abroad that may have serious implications for US interests. It is a fast reaction document, with usually no more than forty eight hours transpiring between conception and promulgation. While designed primarily for the Washington policy community, it receives wide dissemination, including appropriate field activities abroad. Additionally, each memorandum is published in the next National Intelligence Daily to further inform consumers of national level concern.

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Substitute para 2:

The Alert Memorandum was an active vehicle between 1974 and 1976. When the Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for Strategic Warning rotated to a new position in 1976, a successor was not named, and Alert Memoranda fell into disuse. In October 1978, a National Intelligence Officer for Warning was created, largely in response to Congressional demands for a central point of warning responsibility, and the Director of Central Intelligence concurrently revived Alert Memoranda. Since then, thirty two have been issued.

Substitute para on Poland, page 9:

Southeast city of Lublin. While our information about unrest in other areas of Poland is sparse, it is possible that disturbances will intensify and expand to other areas." On 19 September, a second Alert Memorandum reported, "Soviet military activity detected in the last few days leads me to believe that the Soviet leadership is preparing to intervene militarily in Poland if the Polish situation is not brought under control in a manner satisfactory to Moscow. Recent events in Poland itself suggest that the Kania regime may encounter severe difficulties in meeting Moscow's requirements." In a third, published 25 November, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence said, "The Polish leadership is facing its gravest challenge since the strikes on the Baltic Coast in August. I am concerned the Kania regime may resort to force. The present situation moves us closer to coercive measures by the regime or a possible Soviet military invasion." In a fourth on 2 December, the Director opined, "I believe the Soviets are readying their forces for military intervention in Poland. We do not know, however, whether they have made the decision to intervene, or are still attempting to find a political solution." Finally, a fifth memorandum on 2 April 1981, judged, "We believe that the Soviet leaders have been convinced by the evident impotence of the Polish party and government that military intervention is necessary."